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31. Introduction
Trust and trustworthiness are vital components of social and economic exchange
and without their presence many welfare-increasing interactions would not take place. In
fact, Arrow (1974) notes that in the face of transaction costs trust is ubiquitous to almost
every economic transaction. Several studies have argued that the level of trust has a
positive impact on societies’ well-being (e.g., Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995)).
These claims were further supported by empirical evidence of Knack and Keefer (1997),
La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Zak and Knack (2001) who
find a strong positive relationship between estimated levels of trust and economic
performance. This observation thus raises an important question: If societies benefit from
maintaining stable levels of trust and trustworthiness, then what types of instruments are
best suited for achieving this goal?
Recent theoretical and experimental literature has produced some relevant
insights into various mechanisms that have been shown to influence the decisions of
trustors and trustees.1 In principle one can distinguish between two types of mechanisms
for promoting trust: (i) pecuniary, which depend on economic (monetary) incentives; and
(ii) non-pecuniary, which rely primarily on psychological incentives. At this point, it is an
open question whether one of them dominates the other in terms of the levels of trust and
efficiency. Arguably, in practice, most of these mechanisms involve both types of
incentives – economic and psychological2 – and therefore it could be that it is this
interaction which is most effective at promoting trust3.
Real life offers many examples of situations in which trust forms a bond of a
relationship and is reinforced by monetary or/and nonmonetary means. A good example
is marriage which in number of societies combine a public pledge – a non-pecuniary
1 For example, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), Ellingson and Johanesson (2004), Engle-Warnick and
Slonim (2004), Andreoni (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Huck, Ruchala, and Tyran (2007),
Bracht and Feltovich (2008), Dufwenberg, Servátka, and Vadovič (2008), Servátka, Tucker, and Vadovič
(2008a, 2008b) and many others.
2 Non-pecuniary mechanism such as a handshake or an agreement which relies on guilt for example is
usually observed in the repeated game context and hence monetary incentives could be present via
reputation building. On the other hand, pecuniary mechanism such as a contract which relies on fines for
default would not avoid a possibility of guilt or reciprocity.
3 Fehr and Schmidt (2008) examine the interaction between psychological and economic incentives in the
context of contracts and state explicitly: “However, we are just beginning to understand the interaction of
explicit and implicit incentives, which is a fascinating field for future research.”
4instrument – with additional monetary incentives in various forms, i.e., a prenuptial
agreement (in many Western countries), a dowry (Lithuania), or a bridal price (Sudan).
Similarly, any international treaty or a business agreement combines a promise with
possible sanctions for default which could take form of explicit fines or loss of
reputation.
In this paper we select two comparable mechanisms, one pecuniary and the other
non-pecuniary, and examine their relative performance. The former has monetary
consequences and the latter operates through cheap talk communication (as seen from the
perspective of standard neoclassical theory). We first pose a question whether these
pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms affect trust and trustworthiness to the same
degree or whether one of them dominates the other. After we observe their performance
in isolation, we examine the central question of this study, which is the outcome of their
interaction. An important feature of our design is that in our Interaction treatment the
agent has a complete freedom to use one or another mechanism. Therefore, the choices
made reveal what he beliefs is the optimal usage of monetary and nonmonetary
incentives in fostering trust. The aim of our study is two-fold: (1) to shed light on the
relative importance of incentives created by comparable pecuniary and non-pecuniary
mechanisms on trust and (2) to explore their interplay.
The interaction between psychological and economic incentives has been studied
by Fehr and Schmidt (2008) in the context of labor contracts. They examine the interplay
between binding fines for failing to meet the target and nonbinding bonus promises. The
results point strongly in the direction of bonuses that predominate in the contracts
designed by subjects. This study shares an important similarity in that subjects have a
choice using just pecuniary or just non-pecuniary instruments or both. However, an
important difference lies in the fact that in our case the pecuniary instrument does not
depend on explicit enforcement by the third party and our non-pecuniary instrument does
not involve monetary transfers. Therefore, we get a clean comparison of two qualitatively
different instruments that have no common features.
Pecuniary mechanisms fostering relationships that rely on enforceable monetary
payments such as satisfaction guaranteed and escrow accounts were experimentally
studied respectively by Andreoni (2005) and Bracht and Feltovich (2008). In their setup,
5giving the trustor an option to annul the transaction or forfeit the amount that the trustee
deposited in the escrow account can provide sufficient incentives for the trustee to act
upon the terms of deal. In practice, both of the mechanisms hinge on external
enforceability, and thus it is not obvious whether they increase the intrinsic propensity to
trust (i.e., that the trustors would act in the same manner if the annulment of the
transaction or forfeiting the escrow account were up to the trustee’s discretion) or only
replace the incentives to trust with other monetary incentives that make the trustors
behave optimally in the same way as if they were trusting.4
Servátka, Tucker, and Vadovič (2008b), develop a deposit mechanism which is
based on the monetary transfer from the truestee to the trustor prior to playing the trust
game. If implemented, the deposit makes the trustor at least as well off as if no
transaction ever took place, but does not give him any means of enforcing the outcome of
the transaction. It is this pecuniary mechanism that we use in our experiment as it
provides comparable incentives to cheap talk communication.5
Cox (2000) defines trust as an action that generates a monetary gain which could
be shared with another agent and exposes trustor to the risk of a loss of utility if the other
agent defects and appropriates too much or all of the monetary gain. Under this
definition, experiments by Ellingson and Johanesson (2004) and Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) have provided evidence that agents are more likely to trust following
a communication stage. While Ellingson and Johanesson focus on whether
communication can alleviate a hold up problem and facilitate coordination in the Nash
demand game following an investment, Charness and Dufwenberg study the effects of
promises made by trustees in a hidden action game. Although from the standpoint of
neoclassical theory, promises are considered nonbinding, Charness and Dufwenberg
show that their enforcement is based on psychological motivations such as guilt
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)).
While both strands of the literature find that the levels of trust and trustworthiness
can be affected by the described mechanisms, they do not allow for a direct comparison
4 Trust is a vague term which is being used in different ways throughout the literature. To avoid the
ambiguity we will refer to intrinsic trust whenever the trustor cannot legally enforce the contract.
5 The mechanisms are comparable in the sense that neither relies on any enforcement or intervention from
the external party, such as courts or escrow.
6of their relative importance. This is due to different experimental settings across the
studies, and more specifically and importantly, because of the enforceability differences.
In what follows, we present an experiment specially designed to address these two issues.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 provides the
experimental design, and Section 3 describes the experiment procedures. In Section 4,
the experimental results are presented, and Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2. The Experiment
Our experiment consists of a 2x2 design (presented in Table 1) with treatment
variables being the ability to unilaterally communicate and to send a $10 deposit by the
trustee. In all four treatments, subjects play the standard version of Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe (1995) two stage investment game: There are two players, A and B, both
endowed with $10. In stage one, player A decides how much of his initial endowment to
send to her counterpart, i.e., he chooses a whole dollar amount  10,,1,0 S . The
remaining portion of his endowment is his to keep. The amount sent is tripled by the
experimenter. In stage two, player B decides how much of the tripled amount,
 SR 3,,0 , to return to player A. The amount kept by player B is added to his
endowment (if any).
Table 1: Experimental Design
No Deposit Deposit
No Communication Baseline Deposit
Communication Communication Interaction
The treatments vary in the pre-game stage: Baseline does not have a pre-game
stage; in Communication, player B can send a hand-written free form message to player
A; in Deposit, player B has an option to transfer his whole $10 endowment to player A or
keep it for himself (irrespective of player B’s decision, player A is still constrained to
send a maximum of $10 in stage one of the game); finally, in Interaction, we study the
interplay of the two variables by allowing player B to send a message and transfer his
endowment to player A.
7Our objective is to compare two mechanisms for inducing trust: deposit and
communication. We want to know the impact of the mechanisms on overall efficiency (as
determined by the transfer of player A) as well as how individual behavior is affected
from having the mechanism employed. Ex ante, it is not clear which of these mechanisms
is more effective. It is important to note that both deposit and cheap talk (promise) can be
interpreted in the same way in our design: Both can be viewed by player A as a strong
signal that player B is trustworthy; or as a strategic move of player B to induce higher
amount sent and a preparation for defection. Following our discussion in the introduction
section, we have no theoretical reasons to favor one over another. A message may
represent a promise6 but it is still a cheap talk. A deposit, on the other hand, is a credible
commitment which might be a good enough reason for thinking that it will perform
better. Then again, it has been documented that money can sometimes crowd out intrinsic
motivation (Ostrom (2000), Frey and Jegen (2001), Gneezy (2003), Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a, 2000b)).7 It is, therefore, plausible that a deposit could have a negative
effect on trust8 and could perform worse than communication.
Both Deposit and Communication are intended to induce higher amounts sent by
player A. We expect that giving a subject the option to use both will do at least as well as
when they are limited to just using one of them. Our intuition is based on the fact that the
subject can now take advantage of both worlds. That is, send a deposit to establish
credibility (trustworthiness) via foregoing earnings as well as insuring that player A can
be no worse off from investment than they were at the beginning of the game, and send a
message to establish on psychological enforcements (e.g., reciprocity, guilt, conformism,
etc…) and counteract/address the negative aspects of pecuniary methods that lead to the
crowding out of intrinsic motivations. Lastly, if one of these mechanisms clearly
6 In the sense of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
7 A nice exposition of possible detrimental effects of explicit monetary incentives can also be found in Fehr
and Falk (2002).
8 The behavior of players A and B can be seen as ‘proxies’ for trusting and trustworthy behavior (Charness
et al. (2008)). There are other possible motivations why players would send and return positive amounts,
such as other-regarding preferences (Cox (2004)) or preferences for increasing social welfare (Charness
and Rabin (2002)). One could, of course, also ask a follow up question which is how do communication
and deposit affect other-regarding preferences. In this paper we are primarily concerned with the size of the
transfer and efficiency. We leave this other exploration for future research.
8dominates the other, then one can simply choose to use that mechanism and abstain from
the other.
3. Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch,
New Zealand in 2007. A total of 270 subjects participated in the study. Most of the
students had previously participated in economics experiments, and some (but not a
majority) had experience with investment-game-like-scenarios. Each subject only
participated in a single session of the study. On average, a session lasted 50 minutes
including initial instructional period and payment of subjects. Subjects earned on average
17.21 NZD.9 All sessions were hand run in a classroom.
Each session included a minimum of 12 subjects who were randomly matched
into pairs. The assignment of pairs was done according to the following process. The
classroom was segmented in half such that all subjects of a given type would be located
in the same half of the room. The desks for each type were arranged in two rows facing
the wall, and thus neither type would be able to see the other when making decisions. The
subjects were free to choose any seat upon entering the classroom. After the subjects
signed experiment consent forms, the experimenters publicly flipped a coin to determine
which side of the room was to be which type. The allocation of a player A and player B
to a particular pair was done by experimenters randomly pairing one subject from each
side of the room together.
The instructions were projected on the screen and read aloud. The investment
game and general procedures were explained first. Only then did the experimenters
announced that: “Before you play the described game, player B will have an opportunity
to write a message / send their endowment / write a message and/or send their
endowment to their counterpart player A” and projected as well as read aloud the
instructions for the pre-game stage.10 At the end of the instructional period, the
experimenters privately answered subjects’ questions (if any).
9 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was 10.25 NZD per hour (1 NZD
= 0.6943 USD).
10 Obviously, there was no pre-game stage in the baseline treatment.
9In the pre-game stage, players B were given the opportunity to write a message /
transfer their endowment / write a message and/or transfer their endowment to their
counterpart player A on the provided pre-game decision form. In the Deposit and
Interaction treatments the experimenters then filled in the blank in the following sentence
on players’ A decision form:
Player B has transferred $____ to you before the start of the game. This
amount is yours to keep and will be added to your earnings.
Players A were then asked to answer a question why they believed that player B
transferred or did not transfer their $10 endowment to them in the pre-game. It was made
common knowledge that this information would remain private.
In the Communication and Interaction treatments the experimenters passed the
same pre-game decision sheet with (or without) a message to players A from their
counterpart player B. Players A were asked to answer a question why they believed that
player B sent or did not send a message to them in the pre-game and what did the
message (a lack of message) mean to them. Again, it was made common knowledge that
this information would remain private.
In stage one of the investment game, both players were endowed with $10NZ.
Players A had to decide how much of this endowment they wanted to keep for
themselves and how much to transfer to their anonymous player B counterpart. This was
done by writing down a non-negative integer between 0 and 10 on their decision sheet.
As a check for understanding, the players A also had to answer how much money they
kept for themselves. Once everyone made their decisions, all the decision sheets were
collected. The experimenters completed the following statement on players’ B decision
sheets in order to indicate to player B the amount sent to them from their counterpart
player A and the tripled amount for which they need to make their allocation decision:
Player A has transferred $______ to you in Stage 1.
The experimenter has tripled this amount, and you have received $_______
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All decisions sheets were then returned to all players and players B decided how much of
the tripled amount to transfer back to their counterpart player A and how much of it to
keep for themselves. Once again as a check for understanding, players B had to write
down both the amounts returned and kept for themselves.
Upon the completion of stage two the experimenters collected all decision sheets,
transferred the decision information of players B to their player A counterparts' decision
sheet, and returned the decision sheets to all players to reveal their overall earnings.
Lastly, subjects completed a short survey on the experiment and general demographic
information. Upon completion of the questionnaire, subjects were privately paid their
earnings for the session.
4. Results
The behavior of subjects from all four treatments is presented in Figures 1-4 rank
ordered by the amount sent by player A. The amount sent by players A is represented as a
solid bar and the corresponding amount returned by their counterpart player B as an
adjacent patterned bar.11 From these broad first impressions of the data, we can make
some general observations. First of all, the behavior of the baseline treatment is fairly
consistent with the results of previous studies, i.e., players A on average sent 55% of their
endowment and players B returned 31% of the tripled amount received. Also consistent
with previous studies, the communication treatment exhibited quite high levels of trust
and trustworthiness.12 Interestingly, the deposit treatment appears to have performed
slightly better than the baseline in terms of inducing trust, but very poorly in terms of
trustworthiness, e.g., players B returned positive amounts in only 2 of the 10 instances in
which players A sent less than the maximum. When both communication and deposit are
available to player B, the mechanism seems to perform much better than deposit alone
and almost as well communication alone.13
11 Note that the transfer decisions illustrated in Figures 2-4 are irrespective of whether a message and/or
deposit was sent by player B.
12 There was only one player B who did not send a message. The paired player A then sent 0 in stage one.
13 There were only two players B who did not sent a message in the Interaction treatment. In one case the
paired player A sent 0 and in the other he sent 6 while player B responded with returning 8.
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Figure 1: Baseline treatment decisions.
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Figure 2: Communication treatment decisions.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Amount Sent Amount Returned
Figure 3: Deposit treatment decisions.
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Figure 4: Interaction treatment decisions.
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For a closer inspection of the data, we will first focus on the decisions of players
A and compare the distributions of the amount sent in stage one across the four
treatments. The summary information is presented in Table 2. Players A sent the lowest
average amount of 5.55 in Baseline, slightly higher of 6.47 in Deposit, while in
Interaction and Communication the average amounts were 7.88 and 8.92 respectively.
Surprisingly, the treatment with the highest efficiency (as measured by actual realized
payoffs for each pair of players over the maximum possible payoffs) was
Communication, followed by Interaction and Deposit. The lowest level of efficiency was
observed in Baseline. The median amount sent was again the lowest in Baseline at 5,
while quite similar in the other three treatments: 9.5 in Deposit and 10 in both Interaction
and Communication.
13
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Player A (Amount Sent)
Baseline Communication Deposit Interaction
Average
5.55
[4.07]
{33}
8.92
[2.67]
{36}
6.47
[4.17]
{34}
7.88
[3.97]
{32}
Median 5 10 9.5 10
Frequency of t=10 36% 83% 50% 75%
Avg if deposit given - -
7.31
[3.82]
{26}
8.95
[3.15]
{19}
Avg if no deposit - -
3.75
[4.33]
{8}
6
[4.61]
{13}
Avg if message sent -
9.17
[2.22]
{35}
-
8.20
[3.80]
{30}
Avg if no message -
0.00
[0]
{1}
-
3.00
[4.24]
{2}
Standard deviations in brackets. Number of subjects in braces.
Next we compare the effectiveness of inducing trusting behavior by the means of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms. In order to test which one influences the
subjects’ behavior to a larger degree, we compare the amounts sent by players A in
Communication and Deposit treatments conditional on employing the available
mechanism. Both mechanisms were used frequently: In Communication 35 out of 36
(97%) subjects chose to send a message; in Deposit 26 out of 34 (76%) subjects chose to
give a deposit. While both mechanisms increase the average and median amounts sent by
players A relative to the Baseline, the two-sided Mann-Whitney test presented in Table 3
detects that the amount sent in Communication treatment following a message was
statistically significantly higher than the amount sent in the Deposit treatment following a
deposit (p = 0.013).
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Table 3: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Player A (Amount Sent)
Treatment Comm.
Comm.
(message
sent)
Deposit
Deposit
(deposit
given)
Interaction
Interaction
(message
sent)*
Interaction
(deposit
given)**
Baseline
3.97
(p <
0.001)
4.25
(p < 0.001)
0.99
(p = 0.323)
1.71
(p = 0.087)
2.61
(p = 0.009)
2.93
(p = 0.003)
3.22
(p = 0.001)
Comm. - - -2.97(p = 0.003) -
-0.96
(p = 0.338) - -
Comm.
(message sent) - - -
-2.49
(p = 0.013) -
-0.77
(p = 0.444)
0.26
(p = 0.792)
Deposit - - - - 1.75(p = 0.081) - -
Deposit
(deposit given) - - - - -
1.48
(p = 0.139)
2.06
(p = 0.040)
* 19/30 players A also received a deposit.
** All (19/19) players A also received a message.
Result 1: Non-pecuniary incentives influenced the trust of players A to a greater degree
than pecuniary incentives.
While making the two treatments comparable in terms of incentives resulting
from the use of communication and deposit, our design creates non-negligible differences
in terms of potential income effects if player B sends a deposit. Therefore with our
design, it is impossible to distinguish whether the larger amount sent by player A in
comparison to Baseline was due to player A currently having $20 rather than $10 or
whether it was the effect of deposit that was responsible for the observed increase.
Servátka, Tucker, and Vadovič (2008b) address this issue directly and find that the
“deposit effect” causes the increase in amounts sent while the larger amount available to
player A had no significant effect on his decision.
Subsequently we focus our attention on the interaction of the two mechanisms;
we test whether a combination of deposit and message from player B enhances the
amount sent by player A in comparison to only a deposit or a message. Interestingly
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enough, all players B except two who sent a deposit in Interaction treatment also wrote a
message to player A suggesting that the verbal communication is at least as important as
a monetary transfer. This is supported by another observation (which is perhaps less
striking because of the obvious difference in costs) that more subjects decided to send a
message (94%) than to send a deposit (59%).
According to the Mann-Whitney test reported in Table 3, the amount sent in
Deposit after a deposit was given is statistically significantly lower than the amount sent
in Interaction (p = 0.040) when both mechanisms were employed simultaneously.14 The
same test does not detect statistically significant difference between Communication and
Interaction (p = 0.792), but it is worth noticing that the average amount sent is higher in
the treatment where only communication is available, suggesting that the usage (not
necessarily the inclusion) of pecuniary incentives undermines the incentives generated by
the message in the studied environment.
Result 2: A combination of non-pecuniary and pecuniary incentives outperforms stand-
alone pecuniary incentives in terms of inducing higher level of trust of players A. On the
other hand, the same combination does not do better when compared to stand-alone non-
pecuniary incentives.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Player B (Amount Returned)
Baseline Comm.
Comm.
(if message
sent)
Deposit
Deposit
(if deposit
given)
Interaction
Interaction
(if message
sent)*
Interaction
(if deposit
given)**
Average
returned 4.87 12.75 13.11 3.38 3.58 7.88 8.06 8.42
% of
average 3S
returned
31% 46% 48% 17% 16% 35% 33% 31%
* 19/30 players B also gave a deposit.
** All (19/19) players B also sent a message.
Finally, we discuss the effects of studied mechanisms on trustworthiness of
players B. Table 4 presents a summary of subjects’ behavior across the four treatments.
However, because of different levels of income at the time the decision was made and
14 The Interaction (if a deposit given) category, presented in the last column of Table 3, conveys this
information because all players B who gave a deposit in Interaction treatment also sent a message.
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because of different incentives faced by players B such summary only draws a partial
picture on their behavior. Thus, in order to fully assess the effect of communication and
deposit, we estimate a Tobit relation between amounts sent, St, communication, C, given
deposit (D10 if given and D0 if not), and amounts returned, Rt , in the four treatments:15
where the bounds for the Tobit estimation were imposed by the experimental design:
]3,0[ tt SR  .
16
Table 5: Tobit Regression Estimates for Players B Behavior
Rt Coefficient St. Error t P>|t|
Communication 0.57 0.24 2.38 0.019
Deposit = 0 -0.20 0.55 -0.36 0.721
Deposit = 10 -0.53 0.27 -1.93 0.055
Interaction
(Dep = 0) 0.32 0.35 0.91 0.367
Interaction
(Dep = 10) 0.02 0.27 0.07 0.944
St 1.89 0.33 5.74 0.000
Constant -10.06 2.3 -4.41 0.000
We report the results from the estimation in Table 5. The estimated coefficients
are presented in the first column: 1ˆ and  are both positive and significant at 10% level,
indicating that a message sent by players B and a higher amount sent by players A both
increase the amount returned by players B. On the other hand, giving a deposit reduces
15 Because there was only one observation in Communication and two observations in Interaction where
players B did not send a message, we did not create an additional variable representing available
communication but no message sent.
16 While our data is theoretically bound from above by 3St, in the actual experiment it never happened in
that a subject would return the full amount, thus the constraint was never binding. Because Stata, in which
we estimated our Tobit regressions, does not allow specifying upper or lower limits using variables, we
used 30 as the upper bound.
ttt
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t
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the amount returned by players B as most likely they are trying to make up for a decrease
in their payoffs caused by giving a deposit. Not giving a deposit in either Deposit or
Interaction treatment, and giving a deposit in Interaction treatment had no significant
effect. Hence, the Tobit estimation supports the conclusion that communication increases
trustworthiness, but deposit does not.
Result 3: Non-pecuniary incentives increased the trustworthiness of players B while
pecuniary incentives did not.
5. Discussion
Relationships are often fragile and rely on trust from at least one of the parties.
But there are ways of strengthening trust. One is with pecuniary mechanism that is based
on monetary incentives such as deposit. The second is non-pecuniary and could be
accomplished with a simple promise. This paper reports on an experiment that studies
relative performance and mutual interaction of these two mechanisms that are
qualitatively different, but comparable. Our data provide evidence that both deposit and
communication mechanisms significantly enhance trust in comparison to the standard
investment game. However, we find that deposit performs significantly worse than free
form written messages. Furthermore, our results point to the fact that deposit can even be
counterproductive when combined with the ability to make promises. It still remains an
open question, however, whether the deposit is a negative signal towards one’s partner,
i.e., that the partner is not a trusting person, or a negative signal about one’s own self, i.e.,
that he cannot be trusted.
Our results imply that the deposit undermined the trust generated by the message.
This corroborates the findings of Gneezy (2004), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b),
and Fehr and Schmidt (2008) who have both observed qualitatively similar behavior in
different contexts. Thus, our paper could be viewed as a next step in establishing
generality of these conclusions.
Our results are also in line with Brandts and Cooper (2006) who observe that
cheap talk enhances coordination better than financial incentives. The presented
experiment also complements earlier work by Andreoni (2005) who finds that offering a
18
satisfaction guarantee always increases trustworthiness of players B, even when honoring
it is fully voluntary, but only elicits the trust of players A when it is legally enforced. On
the other hand, our findings seem to be at odds with Bracht and Feltovich (2008) who
find that chosen high escrow amount leads to more efficient outcomes. However, it is
important to notice that there is no direct comparison to our study because escrow
effectively eliminates the need for trust, which does not happen in our setting with
deposit. Furthermore, we have implemented only one level of deposit, and hence it is
plausible that a higher deposit would increase trust significantly.
Finally, as with most (if not all) experiments studying social phenomena in
laboratory conditions, one has to cautious when interpreting the results as they may vary
in different strategic and contextual environments (Levitt and List (2007). Therefore, we
tried to nest our findings in the standard version of the investment game to clearly
observe the directional changes. However, it is still possible that a different nature and
level of scrutiny might influence the behavior in other settings.
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Appendix: Instructions
[All instructions were given to the subjects in hardcopy, presented on an overhead to the
entire group, and read aloud by the experimenter.]
[This is the general instructions presented at the beginning of every session.]
You are a Player ____ ID#:____
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment studying decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of
money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is therefore very
important that you read these instructions with care.
No Talking Allowed
It is prohibited to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Should you
have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you
from the experiment and from all payments.
Anonymity
Each person will be randomly matched with another person in the experiment. No one will
learn the identity of the person she/he is matched with. You will be matched with the same
person for the entire experiment.
Types
Each two person group will consist of two types of participants (Player A and Player B) that
are assigned randomly. Your assigned type will be listed at the top of each task instruction
sheet.
The Game
You are randomly paired with another individual. One member of your pair will be a
player A and the other one will be player B. Find your type in the upper right corner of
this sheet. You will never be able to find out the identity of the player you are paired
with.
Each player’s final dollar payout will be determined according to the process below. The
game is divided into stages in which players take turns making decisions. Both player A
and player B begin the game with $10. We will refer to this initial $10 as each player’s
endowment.
Stage 1:
At the beginning to stage 1, player A has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or
none of his/her $10 endowment to player B. The amount that is not transferred is player
A’s to keep. The amount that player A transfers triples when it reaches player B. For
example, if A transfers $10 to B, B receives $30. If A transfers $5 to B, B receives $15. If
A transfers $0 to B, B receives $0.
Stage 2:
Player B then has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or none of the tripled
amount that was transferred to him/her from player A. The amount that is not transferred
is player B’s to keep, and the amount transferred is added to player A’s final dollar
payout.
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[This is the Deposit instructions for the pre-game stage specific to player B. That is, only
players B received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed
on the overhead for all to see and read aloud by the experimenter.]
You are a Player B ID#:____
Pre-Game Instructions
Player A is endowed with $10. Player B is endowed with $10.
The Game to be played NEXT:
 Player A must decide how much, if any, of his/her $10 endowment he/she wants to
transfer to player B.
 Each dollar that is not transferred is player A’s to keep.
 Each dollar that is transferred to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter.
 Player B must then decide how much, if any, of this tripled amount they want to
transfer back to player A and the remaining portion is theirs to keep.
Before we play this game, Player B has the opportunity to transfer his/her $10
endowment to player A and the opportunity to write a message to Player A.
If player A transfers the $10, then it is added to player B’s earnings.
If player A does not transfer the $10, then it is added to player A’s earnings.
Note: If the $10 endowment is transferred by player B,
 it DOES NOT increase the amount that player A has available to transfer in Stage 1.
 the $10 transferred IS NOT tripled.
 Player A is guaranteed to be at least as well off as the initial starting position ($10
endowment) regardless of both players’ transfer decisions during the game.
Why did you transfer or not transfer your $10 endowment to player A?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
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[These are the Interaction treatment instructions for the pre-game stage specific to player
B. That is, only players B received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a
copy was placed on the overhead for all to see and read aloud by the experimenter. After
the decisions were made by player B, the exact sheet was given to their counterpart
player A to reveal their decision and message (if any).]
You are a Player B
Pre-Game Decision Sheet
You have the opportunity to write a message to player A. If you choose to write
anything to your counterpart, please write the message on the space below:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
Please complete the statement below by circling one of the amounts:
I have decided to transfer the following to player A:
$0 or $10
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[These are the Stage 1 instructions (decision sheets) specific to player A. That is, only
players A received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed
on the overhead for all to see and read aloud by the experimenter. Players B never saw
the actual decision sheet of their counterpart. The information/decisions were transferred
to Players’ B decision sheets by the experimenter. Therefore, all handwriting was the
same and no additional messages/information could be transferred.]
You are a Player A ID#:____
The Game: Stage 1 Decision Sheet
Player B has transferred $____ to you before the start of the game.
This amount is yours to keep and will be added to your earnings.
Why do you believe Player B transferred or did not transfer their $10 endowment to
you in the pre-game?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
The Game decision:
You must decide how much, if any, of your $10 endowment you want to transfer to
player B.
Each dollar that is not transferred is yours to keep.
Each dollar that is transferred to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter.
Please complete the statements below. Your decisions must be non-negative
integers, e.g. 0, 1, 2,…, 10.
I have decided to transfer $______ to player B.
Therefore, I have decided to keep $______ for myself.
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[These are the Stage 1 instructions (decision sheets) specific to player B. That is, only
players B received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed
on the overhead for all to see and read aloud by the experimenter. Players A never saw
the actual decision sheet of their counterpart. The information/decisions were transferred
to Players’ A decision sheets by the experimenter. Therefore, all handwriting was the
same and no additional messages/information could be transferred.]
You are a Player B ID#:____
The Game: Stage 2 Decision Sheet
Player A has transferred $______ to you in Stage 1.
The experimenter has tripled this amount, and you have received $_______.
Why do you believe Player A transferred $____ to you in stage 1?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________
You must decide how much, if any, of the $______ you want to transfer to player A.
Each dollar that is not transferred is yours to keep.
Each dollar that is transferred is added to player A’s earnings.
Please complete the statements below. Your decisions must be non-negative
integers.
I have decided to transfer $______ to player A.
Therefore, I have decided to keep $_______ for myself.
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[This is a questionnaire provided to the subjects at the end of the experiment in order to
collect general demographic data as well as ask for any general strategies that they may
have used in making their decisions within the experiment.]
QUESTIONNAIRE
Thank you for participating in the experiment. While we calculate your earnings, please
complete the following survey. All of your responses will remain anonymous and only
linked to the decisions within the experiment via your ID#. Therefore, please answer as
truthfully and completely as possible.
1. Were you a player A or player B?
2. Did you find the instructions clear and self-explanatory? If not, please specify.
3. What was your decision rule when making your choice(s)?
General Demographic Information
1. What is your age? __________
2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.)
01 Male 02 Female
3. Which ethnic group(s) do you belong to? (Circle as many as you need, then write
the country you are from if applicable.)
01 NZ European/Pakeha _ 04 Asian
02 NZ Maori _ Country: _______________
03 Pacific Islander _ 05 Other
Country: _______________ Country: _______________
4. What is your major? (Circle one.)
01 Accounting
02 Economics
03 Finance or Information Systems
04 Education
05 Engineering
06 Law
07 Biological Sciences
08 Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences
09 Social Sciences or History
10 Humanities
11 Psychology
12 Other Fields
5. What is your class standing? (Circle one.)
01 Undergraduate – first year 04 Honours
02 Undergraduate – second year 05 Masters
03 Undergraduate – third year 06 Doctoral
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6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? (Circle one.)
01 Bachelor’s degree
02 Honour’s degree
03 Master’s degree
04 Doctoral degree
7. What was the highest level of education that your father (or male guardian)
completed? (Circle one.)
01 Less than high school (Fifth Form Certificate or Sixth Form Certificate)
02 High school (Bursary or UE)
03 Vocational or trade school
04 College or university
8. What was the highest level of education that your mother (or female guardian)
completed? (Circle one.)
01 Less than high school (Fifth Form Certificate or Sixth Form Certificate)
02 High school (Bursary or UE)
03 Vocational or trade school
04 College or university
9. What is your citizenship status in New Zealand?
01 NZ citizen
02 Permanent Resident
03 Refuge
04 Other
10. Are you a foreign student on a Student Visa?
01 Yes
02 No
11. Are you currently …
01 Single and never married?
02 Married?
03 Separated, divorced or widowed?
12. On a 9-point scale, what is your current GPA if you are doing a Bachelor’s degree,
or what was it when you did a Bachelor’s degree? This GPA should refer to all of
your coursework, not just the current year. Please pick one:
01 Between 7.01 and 9.0 GPA (A- to A+ average)
02 Between 5.01 and 7.0 GPA (B to A- average)
03 Between 3.01 and 5.0 GPA (C+ to B average)
04 Between 1.01 and 3.0 GPA (C- to C+ average)
05 Between 0 and 1.0 GPA (D- to C- average)
06 Have not taken courses for which grades are given
13. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any
dependents. Do not include your parents or flatmates unless you claim them as
dependents. ____________
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14. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of INCOME earned
in last year by the people in your household (as “household” is defined in question
13). [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend
payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security,
alimony, and child support, and others.]
01 $15,000 or under
02 $15,001 - $25,000
03 $25,001 - $35,000
04 $35,001 - $50,000
05 $50,001 - $65,000
06 $65,001 - $80,000
07 $80,001 - $100,000
08 Over $100,000
15. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of INCOME earned
in last year by your parents. [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips,
interest and dividend payments, social security, alimony, and child support, and
others.]
01 $15,000 or under
02 $15,001 - $25,000
03 $25,001 - $35,000
04 $35,001 - $50,000
05 $50,001 - $65,000
06 $65,001 - $80,000
07 $80,001 - $100,000
08 $100,001 - $120,000
09 $120,001 - $140,000
10 Over $140,000
11 Don’t know
12 Known only in foreign currency
Write currency and amount here: _________________
16. Do you work part-time, full-time, or neither? (Circle one.)
01 Part-time
02 Full-time
03 Neither
17. Before taxes, what do you get paid? (Fill in only one.)
01 __________ per hour before taxes
02 __________ per week before taxes
03 __________ per month before taxes
04 __________ per year before taxes
18. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one.)
01 No
02 Yes
If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? _______ packs.
